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publicidad de sí mismo. Han, ya para aca-
bar, llamará a una «revolución temporal»: a 
un tiempo totalmente distinto; a redescubrir 
otro tiempo (el tiempo del otro). Brillante y 
profunda aclaración final de Han: «La actual 
crisis temporal no es la aceleración, sino la 
totalización del tiempo del yo» (126). «A 
diferencia del tiempo del yo, que nos aísla 
y nos individualiza, el tiempo del otro crea 
una comunidad» (127).
Así pues, con su estilo particular, escri-
biendo al estilo de lo que me gusta llamar 
«videoclips» o «instantáneas», Han des-
monta con cada una de sus palabras nuestro 
sentir, nuestra sociedad y nuestro tiempo. 
La finalidad de Han y de sus libros (o al 
menos, para mí) es mostrarnos que no somos 
como queremos ser; sino que somos como 
quieren que seamos; y lo más importante: 
que hay alternativas. Me gustaría decir para 
acabar que, coger un libro de Han e intentar 
resumirlo puede resultar en una tarea un 
tanto difícil (aunque eso sí, no imposible), 
ya que sus ideas van y vienen a lo largo de 
sus libros, aparecen ahora para desaparecer 
o reaparecer luego, complementándolas o 
hilándolas de una forma que sólo Han puede 
hacer. Por eso, como ya he dicho, sólo con 
la lectura de uno solo de los libros de Han 
no vamos a poder profundizar tal y como 
se merece en todo su pensamiento. Pero 
eso sí: nos ayudará a acercarnos a él. Un 
acercamiento que nos producirá miedo, un 
miedo provocado por lo distinto y que nos 
llevará al asombro; un asombro que, para 
Han, infunde vida al espíritu. Y es que eso 
es Han para mí: ese otro que reclama, eso 
distinto que nos llama a la puerta y que no 
podemos expulsar. Porque ser es ser con 
otros; y sin otros no podemos ser. En defi-
nitiva, un libro necesario. Como todos los 
libros de Byung-Chul Han.
Francisco Giménez Mateu
http://dx.doi.org/10.6018/daimon/308421
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Stuart Glennan is one of the most 
relevant philosophers of the new mechanical 
philosophy. The new mechanical philosophy, 
which emerged between the last 1980s and 
the early 1990s, is a group of philosophers 
who have underlined the importance of 
mechanisms in science. Other authors 
related to it are Peter Machamer, Carl Craver, 
Lindley Darden, and William Bechtel. 
Since the mid-1990s, when his influential 
“Mechanisms and the Nature of Causation” 
(1996) was published, Glennan has made 
several contributions to the contemporary 
debate about mechanisms. The aim of The 
New Mechanical Philosophy (2017), which 
is his most recent book, is to compile his 
ideas about mechanisms and address several 
philosophical topics from the new mechanical 
approach. Glennan considers that the new 
mechanical philosophy is both a philosophy 
of science and a philosophy of nature. Not 
only is it suitable for analysing science, but 
also for inquiring the constitution of the 
natural world.
The book could be divided into two 
parts. In the first part, which includes 
chapters 1 to 5, Glennan develops his 
notion of mechanism. He also characterizes 
the models that represent mechanisms. In 
the second part, which includes chapters 
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6 to 8, he takes the notion of mechanism 
as the starting point for addressing 
several philosophical issues. He proposes 
a mechanistic account of causation and 
characterizes scientific explanations.
After introducing the topic (ch. 1), 
Glennan proposes a minimal characterization 
of mechanisms, which includes what all 
mechanisms have in common (ch. 2). He is 
interested in mechanisms across the sciences, 
not in a particular kind of mechanisms (e.g. 
neurobiological mechanisms). This interest 
is influenced by the work by Phyllis M. 
Illari and Jon Williamson. In “What is a 
mechanism? Thinking about mechanisms 
across the sciences” (2012), Illari and 
Williamson underlined the convenience 
of thinking about mechanisms in general 
terms. They claimed that this approach is 
needed in order to address some relevant 
methodological issues (e.g. causal 
explanation, metaphysics of causality…).
Glennan defines a mechanism as 
follows: “A mechanism for a phenomenon 
consists of entities (or parts) whose 
activities and interactions are organized so 
as to be responsible for the phenomenon” 
(Glennan, 2017, 18). He considers that 
all mechanisms are mechanisms for some 
phenomenon. A mechanism could not even 
be identified without making reference to 
a phenomenon. Mechanisms are composed 
of entities and activities. Entities are things 
with stable boundaries and properties, while 
activities are processes that produce changes 
through time. Entities engage in activities, 
and activities that involve more than one 
entity are called interactions. Examples of 
mechanisms would be a modern toilet, a 
circulatory system, a market, a computer… 
This characterization of mechanisms is 
the third version of Glennan’s proposal. 
Glennan’s basic considerations about 
mechanisms have remain stable through 
time. He has always considered that 
mechanisms are compounds that are part of 
the real world. Nevertheless, some aspects 
of his proposal have changed. For example, 
his idea of how mechanisms’ component 
entities interact has varied. Initially, when 
“Mechanisms and the Nature of Causation” 
was published, he considered that those 
interactions were according to direct causal 
laws. This was problematic because laws 
are often considered exceptionless and parts’ 
interactions do not instantiate exceptionless 
generalizations. Later, when he published 
“Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation” 
(2002), he claimed that interactions among 
mechanisms’ parts were characterized 
by direct, invariant, and change-relating 
generalizations. Glennan appealed to 
the notion of invariance developed by 
James Woodward in “Explanation and 
Invariance in the Special Sciences” (2000). 
Woodward considers that a change-relating 
generalization describing a relationship 
between the variable X and the variable Y is 
invariant if it would continue to hold under 
at least some intervention on such variables. 
In The New Mechanical Philosophy, 
Glennan characterizes interactions just as 
activities that involve more than one entity. 
Other aspect of Glennan’s proposal that has 
changed through time is how component 
entities’ stability is characterized.
Glennan asserts that mechanisms, which 
are real entities in the world, are represented 
by models, which are often abstract entities 
(ch. 3). He understands models in a broad 
sense and defines them simply as “a whole 
range of devices scientists use to represent 
aspects of the world” (Glennan, 2017, 60). 
He considers that a model will successfully 
represent a target if it resembles the target in 
some relevant degrees and respects. Which 
degrees and respects are relevant depends 
on modeller’s purposes. Mechanistic models 
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(i.e. models that represent mechanisms) must 
have two parts: a model of the phenomenon 
and a model of the mechanism that is 
responsible for it.
Mechanisms can be classified into kinds. 
Regarding this classification, Glennan 
proposes the models-first approach. He 
considers that two particular mechanisms 
belong to the same kind if they are 
representable by the same model (ch. 4). 
It is a pluralistic and cross-classifying 
approach. One mechanism could be an 
instance of several kinds. Concerning 
kind’s ontological status, Glennan supports 
a weak realism. He considers that there 
are natural classifications that are mind-
independent, non-arbitrary and independent 
of human interests. Mechanisms’ kinds can 
be identified by focusing on several aspects 
of mechanisms (ch. 5). These aspects are: 
(i) kinds of produced phenomena, (ii) 
kinds of component entities, (iii) kinds 
of component activities, (iv) kinds of 
components’ organizations, and (v) kinds 
of etiologies. For instance, regarding kinds 
of produced phenomena, it is possible to 
distinguish among mechanisms that produce 
outputs as a result of inputs (e.g. a Coke 
machine), mechanisms that produce outputs 
independently of inputs (e.g. a watch), and 
mechanisms that maintain stable outputs in 
the light of varying inputs (e.g. mechanisms 
that maintain near constant body temperature 
in warm-blooded animals).
Having laid his notion of mechanism, 
Glennan utilizes it for addressing several 
philosophical issues. Regarding causality, 
he supports a mechanistic account (chs. 
6-7). He considers that causes and effects 
must be connected by mechanisms. The 
statement “event c causes event e” will be 
true just in case there exists a mechanism 
by which c contributes to the production 
of e. He understands causal claims as 
existential claims about mechanisms. 
Glennan’s approach is ontological. Truth 
of causal claims depends on features of 
the world. It is also singularist (i.e. it 
does not reduce singular causal relations 
to instantiations of causal generalizations 
or laws) and intrinsic (i.e. causal relation 
is considered an intrinsic relation that 
depends on intrinsic properties of cause and 
effect). Glennan is aware that his approach 
is conceptually non-reductive. It does 
not conceptually eliminate causes, since 
the notion of mechanism is itself causal. 
However, he considers that it is informative, 
because it shows the relationships between 
several types of causal concepts.
Secondly, Glennan addresses scientific 
explanation (ch. 8). He asserts that 
mechanistic ontology is compatible with an 
explanatory pluralism. Glennan considers 
that explanation is a matter of representing 
by means of models. A model is explanative 
if it shows dependence between the 
explanans and the explanandum. Given 
the fact that there are non-causal sorts of 
dependence, non-causal explanations are 
possible. Glennan thinks that unification is 
a desirable value for explanations, although 
he regrets it as a necessary condition. 
Explanatory models unify when they show 
that two or more things are similar in what 
they depend upon or in what depends upon 
them.
Glennan considers that there are three 
main kinds of explanations: bare causal 
explanations, mechanistic explanations, 
and non-causal explanations. Bare causal 
explanations identify events, properties or 
states of affairs that are causally relevant for 
the explanandum phenomenon. They note 
the cause of the phenomenon, but they do 
not identify the mechanism that connects 
it with the phenomenon. Mechanistic 
explanations are how explanations. They 
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show how the explanandum phenomenon 
depends upon mechanisms. Bare causal 
explanations and mechanistic explanations 
are causal explanations, because they 
show causal dependences. Non-causal 
explanations are explanations that show 
varieties of dependence that are not causal 
(e.g. equilibrium explanations). 
I would like to note that, despite its 
interest and novelty, Glennan’s proposal has 
some problematic aspects. He makes several 
considerations about the new mechanical 
philosophy as a whole (e.g. he claims that 
it is both a philosophy of nature and a 
philosophy of science), but his concept of 
it is too narrow. For instance, it excludes 
epistemic approaches to mechanisms (i.e. 
approaches that consider that mechanisms 
are abstract entities). On the other hand, 
although his characterization of mechanisms 
suits a great variety of mechanisms, it is not 
concrete enough. It is not clear what the 
difference between mechanisms and other 
compound objects would be. He increases 
the scope of his notion of mechanism in 
exchange for reducing its content.
In conclusion, The New Mechanical 
Philosophy is one of the most relevant books 
about mechanisms since the early 2000s. 
Glennan shows his compromise with the 
recently proposed idea that mechanisms should 
be thought across the sciences and presents 
a new version of his influential definition 
of mechanism. He also addresses the main 
issues related to mechanisms: causation and 
explanation. The structure and style of the 
book make it highly recommendable both for 
experts in the field and for other philosophers 
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Homero, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, 
Franz Kafka, Marcel Proust, Bertolt Bre-
cht, Hermann Broch e Isak Dinesen: con 
la obra de todos ellos estableció Hannah 
Arendt un diálogo más o menos intenso y 
sostenido en el tiempo. La nómina, así lo 
muestra el volumen que reseñamos, deja 
entrever la importancia que la literatura tuvo 
para la autora y nos recuerda un aspecto, el 
de la reflexión estética, tan crucial para el 
proyecto arendtiano como insuficientemente 
tratado. Recordemos cómo el lugar en que se 
inserta el análisis de esta problemática en La 
condición humana, obra clave de la autora 
y del pensamiento del siglo XX, expresa 
con elocuencia la pertinencia de su estudio. 
Como producto material fabricado por la 
mano del hombre, las páginas dedicadas a 
la obra de arte constituyen la última sección 
del capítulo que aborda temáticamente el 
trabajo, pero son también, y no de modo 
arbitrario, aquellas que preceden al desarro-
llo expositivo de la naturaleza de la acción 
humana. La obra artística se sitúa, por tanto, 
en un espacio liminar entre los objetos que 
fabricamos y nos rodean, constituyendo una 
sede estable frente al incesante cambio de lo 
biológico, y aquello que, inestable y frágil, 
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